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The structure of the American family is changing.1 Over the
past twenty years, "alternative" families have become more
common and more pronounced in our society.2 What was once
thought of as the American norm, a married couple with their own
children, is now a shrinking minority. 3 In 1970, the "traditional"
nuclear family (consisting of a married couple and their biological
or adopted children) was the most common family structure,
comprising more than forty percent of all families. 4 By 1994, fewer
than twenty-six percent of all households consisted of this type of
family. 5 With the decrease in the popularity of the traditional
* -ART is an acronym for Assisted Reproductive Technology. There are many
methods of assisted conception. See generally D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN
FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 1207-59 (1998) (discussing alternatives
to adoption such as artificial insemination, surrogacy, in vitro fertilization, and
embryo transplantation). For the purposes of this Note, ART refers to artificial
insemination.
** J.D. expected 2001, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to the
editors and staff of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice; Professor
Mary Louise Fellows, for introducing me to this topic; David Selden, for his
editorial and research assistance; Luke Ayres, for his enduring emotional support;
and my two Dads.
1. See James R. Robinson, Untangling the "Loose Threads" Equitable
Adoption, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal Family
Arrangements, 48 EMORY L.J. 943, 943 (1999).
2. See id. Television reflects the change in popular culture. In an earlier era,
popular television programs such as Leave it to Beaver (CBS & ABC, 1957-1963)
and Father Knows Best (CBS & NBC, 1954-1962) depicted traditional nuclear
families. However, the Beaver Cleaver family is no longer the norm. See inf'a
notes 3-9 and accompanying text. Today, modern ideas of family are reflected in
television plots including: a single father sharing custody of his son with his ex-wife
(the mother) and her lesbian partner, see Friends (NBC, premiered 1994); divorced
parents sharing custody of their son by regularly flying him cross-country, see
Frasier (NBC, premiered 1993); and a child having "two daddies," which is viewed
by his playmates as "a dude's paradise," see Malcolm in the Middle (Fox, premiered
2000).
3. See STEVE W. RAWLINGS & ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,





family structure, a rise has occurred in the number of nonfamilies
and other types of families, such as co-habitating partners (both
opposite-sex and same-sex couples) and lesbian- and gay-parented
families.6  In 1970, 523,000 households were headed by an
unmarried couple.7  In 1998, that number had climbed to
5,911,000.8 Of these, 1,674,000 (over twenty-five percent) were
headed by two unrelated adults of the same sex, and 167,000 of
those had children under age fifteen. 9
The courts have already recognized that this change in family
structure requires changes in the laws governing families. 10
Unfortunately, state legislatures have been slow to act on the
subject. While there has been a recent movement by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (hereinafter
"NCCUSL") to address current parenting issues," the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) drafted by NCCUSL in 1973 is still the most
6. See id. The Census Bureau defines "family" as a group of two or more
people living together and related by birth, marriage, or adoption. See id. at B-2.
Though the Census Bureau does not define "nonfamily," this Note will assume it is
a household consisting of people not related by birth, marriage or adoption.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNMARRIED-COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS, BY
PRESENCE OF CHILDREN: 1960 TO PRESENT, at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/ms-la/tabad-2.txt (Jan. 7, 1999) (citing
TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. P20-514, MARITAL STATUS AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) (1998) and earlier reports; U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, No. PC(2)-4B, PERSONS BY
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS tbl. 11 (1970)).
8. See TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NO. P20-514, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) 71 tbl.8 Households
with Two Unrelated Adults, by Marital Status, Age, and Sex: March 1998 (1998),
at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/ms-la.html.
9. See id. There are no statistics from the 1970 census that reveal how many
households were headed by same-sex couples.
10. See, e.g., Kathleen C. v. Lisa W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that the court's hands are tied without legislative action on the matter); In
re R.C., Minor Child, 775 P.2d 27, 29 (Colo. 1989) (citing commentary regarding the
flaws of section 5 of the UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973)); Thomas S. v.
Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (App. Div. 1994) ("While the question of the
respective rights of a gay life partner vis-A-vis a biological parent presents a timely
issue for consideration ... reform of the Domestic Relations Law § 111 is
exclusively the province of the Legislature."); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239,
243 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) ("We cannot rewrite the act.").
11. See UNIF. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT (UPUFA), 9B U.L.A. 98
(1998 & Supp. 2000) (addressing late claims of paternity); UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (USCACA), 9B U.L.A. 199 (1998 & Supp.
2000). Neither of these laws has been widely adopted by the states. To date, no
state has adopted the UPUFA, and only two states have adopted the USCACA. See




widely used uniform law. Eighteen states currently follow the
Uniform Parentage Act. 12
The UPA has not been revised in its twenty-seven years of
existence, despite the changes in family structure, demographics,
and reproductive technologies. As a result, it perpetuates
significant problems regarding custody and visitation rights,
particularly as applied to same-sex parents. In light of the modern
family structure and accompanying legal issues, it is time that the
UPA legally recognize same-sex parents, and thus create legal
certainty for these families. One particular recurring problem
arises out of the UPA's failure to acknowledge a second parent for
children conceived through assisted reproductive technology by a
lesbian couple.
While adoption has become a popular means for same-sex
couples to begin their families, 13 more and more lesbian couples
are seeking to have children through ART. 14 For many lesbian
couples, private conception though ART is inexpensive and easy,
providing the couple with all the advantages of childbearing: a
genetic connection with the child, the experience of pregnancy and
childbirth, and a link to society's preconceived notions of
womanhood.15
This Note focuses on the injustices the UPA creates for
lesbian parents and their ART children. It discusses the UPA
12. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-22 (1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7731
(West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to 19-4-130 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, §§ 801-819 (1998); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1998); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 45/1.1-45/21.1 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to 38-1131
(1993); MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.75 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.817-.852 (West
1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to 40-6-135 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
126.011-.371 (Michie 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:17-59 (West 1999);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11-1 to 40-11-23 (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-
01 to 14-17-26 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01-.19 (West 1999); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 15-8-1 to 15-8-27 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010-.905 (West
1999); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120 (Michie 1999).
13. See Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at Differing State
Court Opinions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (1998) (citing as an example In re the
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995)).
14. See Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination
Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 183 (1996); Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The
Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 431, 436 (1999).
15. See Harlow, supra note 16, at 184. What have come to be known as "baster
babies" can be conceived in the privacy of one's own home for no cost. See id. at 179
(citing Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-baster Babiea" The
Demedicalization of Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5 (1991)). All that is
required to perform the procedure is a willing sperm donor, a turkey baster and a
woman ready to become impregnated. See id.
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generally, focusing on certain provisions that are especially
problematic: those that cause courts to disregard the best
interests of the children and the rights of their mothers in deciding
custody and visitation issues.' 6 It then describes NCCUSL's
proposed revisions to the UPA drafted during the fall of 1999;' 7
analyzes case law under the current LPA; and predicts the effects
the proposed revisions may have.18 This Note concludes by
proposing that NCCUSL could equitably solve most of the
problems faced by courts applying the UPA today by creating an
intent-based standard in determining the legal parentage of ART
children. 19
II. Background
The UPA does not recognize the possibility of unmarried
motherhood-by-choice. 20 The UPA was not written to address
situations in which the mother of a child wished to be the sole
parent or co-parent with a person other than the biological father.
To the contrary, it was written to address the problems faced by
unmarried mothers-by-accident who are often left to face the
parental responsibilities and financial burdens of child rearing
alone. 21 As a result, states that have adopted the UPA, as well as
those that have not, base their laws on one set of assumptions
about all unmarried mothers, consistently adhering to the policy
goal that "a child be provided with a father as well as a mother."22
These assumptions have led to two major consequences for
unmarried women, particularly lesbians, who choose to have
children through ART. One is that the sperm donor may later
return and declare paternity rights. 23 Another is that the non-
16. See infra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
17. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm (Oct. 1999).
18. See infra notes 121-235 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
20. See UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.LA. 288 (1973); Carol A.
Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood-by-Choice, 11
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193, 207 (1983). In her article, Donovan coins the
terms "unmarried mother-by-choice" as opposed to the oft-presumed "unmarried
mother-by-accident." See id. at 193.
21. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287-90 (1973);
Donovan, supra note 20, at 193-94.
22. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824 (Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. Cumberland County,
N.J. 1977).
23. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533-35, 537-38 (Ct.
App. 1986) (declaring the sperm donor to be the legal father when semen was given
directly to mother rather than to physician); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d
356, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (reversing lower court's denial of parental rights to
[Vol. 19:65
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biological mother in a lesbian couple may lose all rights to the
children should the couple ever separate.
24
A. The Uniform Parentage Act
In 1973, when the UPA was written, many state laws
governing nonmarital children had recently been subjected to
constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court.25 In 1972, the
Court declared that discrimination based on the "status of
illegitimacy" is both "illogical and unjust."26 At the time, fighting
for the equal rights of nonmarital children seemed to be a novel
idea.2 7  Since many states' laws perpetuated this type of
discrimination, 28 a new set of acts was needed to replace those that
would surely be declared unconstitutional when challenged. In
1973, NCCUSL drafted the UPA to resolve the legal issues
surrounding nonmarital children. 29 These issues include rights of
intestate succession, financial support obligations, and custody
and visitation rights.30 Since the Supreme Court had already
declared constitutional equality for nonmarital children, NCCUSL
focused its drafting efforts on identifying the person "against
whom these rights may be asserted."31
sperm donor, when he was known to the child as her father).
24. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-19 (Ct. App. 1991)
(awarding sole legal custody to the biological mother); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (denying visitation rights to former partner who was a
"biological stranger" to the child, even though the couple had agreed to raise the
child together). Though the non-biological mother may legally adopt the child, this
option is available only in those states that allow adoption by stepparents.
Stepparent adoption allows a second parent to adopt a child without the biological
parent losing legal recognition as a parent. See generally Julia Frost Davies, Two
Monts and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional Family Through Second Parent
Adoption, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1055, 1055-78 (1995) (examining the legal obstacles
to lesbian co-parent adoption). Another legal hurdle for lesbian couples is that
some states do not allow adoption by homosexuals. See infra note 67.
25. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287-90 (1973).
26. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), quoted in UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 288 (1973).
27. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 288 (1973).
28. See id. at 287-90.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (declaring that
"illegitimate" children are 'persons' within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," and therefore cannot be denied standing to
sue for the wrongful death of their mother). The Louisiana Court of Appeals had
held that "child" in the state laws meant only "legitimate child." Id. This Note
focuses on the legal issues of determining who an ART child's legal parents are for
the purposes of custody and visitation rights, but it should be noted that
establishing a legal parent-child relationship implicates many legal consequences.
See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 35-40 (1998).
31. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 289 (1973).
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In its entirety, the UPA creates a set of presumptions to
determine the parentage of a child.32 For example, section 4
creates the presumption that a married woman's husband is the
father of any children born during their marriage. 33 The UPA
governs who may bring an action to establish paternity, 34 when
and where such an action may be brought, 35 who is to be party to
such an action.36 It also establishes a set of presumptions to
determine the parentage of an ART child.
37
B. Section 5 of the UPA
The UPA devotes only one section, section 5, to conception
through ART.38 The comment following UPA section 5 admits that
"[t]his Act does not deal with many complex and serious legal
32. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 33-60 and
accompanying text.
33. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 298 (1973). Though this provision
may seem superfluous to many, it has been relied upon in litigation. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Sybouts, 645 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Wash. 1982) (presuming the ex-husband to
be the father of the child when it was born after the couple divorced, but within the
300-day time limit imposed by the UPA), noted in UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT notes of
decs., 9B U.L.A. 300 (1973).
34. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 302 (1973) (stating that a child,
his or her natural mother, the putative father or any interested party may bring an
action to establish paternity).
35. See id. § 7, at 306 (dictating that an action must be brought within three
years of the birth of a child if brought by someone other than the child; if the child
brings the action, the statute of limitations expires three years after the child has
reached the age of majority); see also id. § 8, at 309-10 (establishing that an action
may be brought in the state where the child was conceived).
36. See id. § 9, at 312 (requiring that the child, the mother and every presumed
or alleged father must be made party to the action).
37. See id. § 5, at 301; see also infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
(providing text of § 5 and citing authorities that discuss the presumptions).
38. Section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act reads in its entirety:
§ 5. [Artificial Insemination]
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the
natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must
be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify
their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's
consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept
confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so
does not affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records
pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the permanent record of a
court or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are
subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973).
[Vol. 19:65
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problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination."39 In
fact, the UPA not only ignores many legal problems faced by
women seeking ART, but also creates additional ones.
40
Provision (a) of section 5 addresses the issue of establishing a
legal parent-child relationship between the intended father and an
ART child rather than legally recognizing the sperm donor as the
father.4' The provision allows paternity to be established between
the intended father and his ART child if a licensed physician
supervises the insemination and verifies that the husband
consented to the procedure. 42 The intended father in these cases is
necessarily the husband since the UPA contemplates ART only for
married women. 43 If the physician fails to fulfill her or his
statutory obligations, the UPA states that this cannot affect the
parent-child relationship otherwise established. 44 In other words,
the intended father is still the legal father of the child even if the
physician does not fulfill her or his obligation under the UPA.
Some states following the UPA have omitted the word
"married" as a qualifier from provision (a).45  To date, this
omission has not been a benefit to the interests of unmarried
women who conceive through ART.46 While courts have read the
omission to signify that unmarried women are not proscribed from
ART, no state has interpreted it to mean that they receive the
same protections under the statute as married women do.47
39. Id. at 302; see also In re R.C., Minor Child, 775 P.2d 27, 30 (Colo. 1989)
(acknowledging that the UPA, which was adopted in Colorado. does not address all
the questions concerning ART); Denise S. Kaiser, Artificial Insemination: Donor
Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 796
(1987/88) ("The proposed AID [artificial insemination by donor other than husband]
section of the UPA is sketchy overall, and is silent as to what its application would
be for an unmarried woman.").
40. See infra notes 109-212 and accompanying text.




45. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West 2000) (codifying the UPA but
omitting the word "married" from the artificial insemination section); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to 19-4-130 (1999) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11-1 to 40-11-
23 (Michie 1999) (same).
46. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., In re R.C., Minor Child, 775 P.2d 27, 30 (Colo. 1989) (noticing that
the word "married" is omitted from Colorado's version of the UPA). Here, the court
interpreted the omission to mean that in the case of married women, the "legal
rights and duties of fatherhood [shall be] borne by the recipient's husband rather
than the donor." Id. at 30. The court does not address the effect this omission has
on unmarried women. See id.; see also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530,
534 (Ct. App. 1986) (noticing that California has also omitted the word "married"
from its codification of the UPA). In Jhordan C., the court interpreted this to mean
that the statute can apply to unmarried women, thus precluding a donor's claim of
20011
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Provision (b) of section 5 defines who is not the father of an
ART child.48 The provision clearly states that a sperm donor who
gives semen to a married woman who is not his wife is not the
father of a child so conceived. 49 Unlike provision (a), there is no
margin for error. Rather, the clause has two all-important
qualifiers. The sperm donor must provide the semen to a licensed
physician who in turn provides it to a married woman. 50 Again,
the UPA does not comment on what should happen if the woman
is not married or if the sperm donor does not use a physician as an
intermediary. 51 As case law demonstrates, neither marriage nor
the supervision of a physician is necessary for a woman to
successfully conceive a child through ART. 52
The "licensed physician" requirement 53 and the "married
woman" requirement have consequently become particularly
problematic. A survey of cases decided under the UPA reveals
that the assumption that only married women conceive by ART
with the help of a licensed physician is erroneous. 54 Partially
because of these requirements and partially because the UPA
simply fails to address the possibility of a non-traditional family, a
substantial amount of litigation has arisen under this section of
the UPA. 55 These issues are especially problematic for lesbian
mothers since they cannot legally marry and thereby obtain the
protection of the UPA to preclude a claim of paternity.5 6
paternity, as long as the sperm was provided to a licensed physician. See id. at
534. For more on this point, see infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. See generally infr-a notes 109-127 and accompanying text
(discussing these requirements and the legal ramifications for lesbian partners
contemplating ART).
51. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973) (failing to address the
situations of unmarried women or self-insemination).
52. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986) (unmarried
mother and no physician involvement); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. Dom. Rel.
Ct. Cumberland County, N.J. 1977) (same); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27
(N.Y. 1991) (unmarried mother).
53. Though the UPA is not phrased in such a way to state that the presence of a
licensed physician is "required," its language does not address the possibility that a
physician would not be involved in the procedure. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5,
9B U.L.A. 301 (1973). Consequently, the courts have read the Act to require the
presence of a licensed physician to receive the protections of the presumptions
under the UPA. See, e.g., Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38 (holding that
because no physician was involved in the procedure, Jhordan C. (a known donor)
maintained paternity rights even though he would not have been the legal father of
the child under the UPA if a physician had been involved).
54. See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 139-168 and accompanying text.
56. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
[Vol. 19:65
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Two main types of cases have emerged from the litigation
regarding the custody and visitation of ART children of unmarried
women. In one type of case, the sperm donor enters the child's life
against the will of the mother(s).57 The courts have consistently
granted the sperm donor paternity status, with all of its privileges
and obligations.5 8 The second type of case, which affects lesbian
couples exclusively, arises after the couple breaks up and the non-
biological mother brings an action requesting joint custody or
visitation.5 9 Under the UPA, the non-biological mother has no
legal claim to the children; indeed, courts have almost uniformly
found that this mother lacks standing to even sue. 60
C. The Latest Developments
Recently, the courts have begun considering intent when
determining parentage in non-traditional families. 61 Although
these decisions have been criticized as extreme examples of
judicial willfulness, each case has considered the equitable
interests involved in reaching its conclusion. 62 This line of cases,
(codified in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.) (precluding same-sex marriage as
a matter of federal law, thus preempting any state law to the contrary); see also
infra notes 139-168 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which lesbian
mothers have been denied standing as parents).
57. See infra notes 139-168 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 145-182 and accompanying text.
59. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973) (failing to address the
non-biological mothers' rights in relation to their ART children); GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 146 (2d ed. 1997) (asserting that under
a literal interpretation of the UPA and similar statutes, "if one lesbian partner
gives birth to a child as a result of [ART], the other partner isn't treated as that
child's parent."); see also Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990)
(deciding that the non-biological mother has no statutory standing to assert a claim
for custody or visitation against the biological mother).
60. See infra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
61. See In Re McAllister & Subak, No. FL032006 (Cal. Super., San Fran. Co.,
May 24, 1999) (unpublished decision), discussed in California Superior Court
Grants Legal Parent Status to Lesbian Couple Prior to Child's Birth, LESBIAN/GAY
LAW NOTES (LeGaL Found. of the Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y.)
Summer 1999, at 110. Judge Donna Hitchens granted a petition to declare both
mothers in a lesbian couple the parents of their ART child. See id. Though this
case had especially unique facts (one mother donated her egg, the other carried the
fetus to term), Judge Hitchens stated that the intent of the parties was the guiding
principle. See id.; see also R.E.M. v. S.L.V., FD-15-748-98N (N.J., Ocean County
Super. Ct., Nov. 2, 1998) (unpublished decision) (granting joint custody to non-
biological mother). This case was apparently the first to grant a same-sex co-
parent joint custody where the issue was contested. See Elizabeth Amon, Lesbian
Ex-Partner Awarded Joint Custody, 154 N.J.L.J. 433, 433, 440 (Nov. 9, 1998).
Judge Vincent Grasso based his decision in part on his finding that both partners
intended to parent the child together. See id.
62. See supra note 61. Another New Jersey judge confronted with a similar set
of facts denied custody to the non-biological mother, stating that "[tihere is no basis
for the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant to be afforded the same
20011
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albeit a minority, provides persuasive precedent demonstrating
how courts can and have interpreted existing law so that non-
traditional parents and their children receive the legal protection
they desire and deserve.
1. States Have Begun to Recognize Same-sex Parents
Through Legislation.
Under current interpretations of the UPA, it is sometimes
possible for lesbian-headed families to protect their rights and
their family autonomy even if they have ART children. 63 At least
one state that adopted the UPA also adopted subsequent
legislation that protects women's autonomy in ART.64 Other
states have allowed same-sex couples to participate in stepparent
adoptions, where a stepparent (or equivalent) adopts a child
without terminating the biological parent's rights.65 It should be
noted, however, that this solution has not been accepted by all
states. 66 A few states proscribe any adoption by a homosexual
protection as a heterosexual marriage because New Jersey does not recognize
same-sex marriages." Press Release, Associated Press, Amy Westfeldt, Lesbian
Denied Joint Custody of Ex-Partner's Children (Sept. 23, 1998) (on file with Low
and Inequality: A Journal of Theory & Practice).
63. See supra note 61.
64. See In re R.C., Minor Child, 775 P.2d 27, 32 n.6 (Colo. 1989) (noting that
after the decision in C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. Cumberland
County, N.J. 1977), the New Jersey legislature enacted a statute creating the
presumption that a man donating sperm to a woman other than his wife has no
parental obligations to a child so conceived, and the presumption is rebuttable only
if there was an agreement in writing and to the contrary, citing N.J. REV. STAT. §
9:17-44(b) (1988)). Notably, this statute does nothing to establish a parental
relationship for an intended co-parent other than the biological father. See
generally N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:17-44(b) (1988) (adopting the provisions of the UPA
concerning parental status of ART children).
65. See Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). In this
case, the court held that "when the family unit is comprised of the natural mother
and her partner, and the adoption is in the best interest of the children,
terminating the natural mother's rights is unreasonable and unnecessary." Id. at
1272. The court found that while adoption by same-sex couples was likely not
contemplated by the drafters in 1945, it was not prescribed by statute, and thus
should be permitted. See id. at 1274. The court also noted that creation of the
stepparent exception in the adoption statutes recognizes the ridiculous outcome
should the biological parent's relationship with her child be legally terminated in
spite of the fact that the parent will continue to be active in her child's life. See id.
Thus, the court found it consistent with this logic and policy to apply the
stepparent exception to those similarly situated. See id. The court also noted that
a District of Columbia court had reached a similar result, as had a New York court.
See id. at 1274-75.
66. The parental rights of same-sex couples vary widely with the states'
treatment of gay rights in general, particularly regarding same-sex marriage.
Vermont is now widely regarded as one of the most progressive states with respect
to gay rights in light of its recent Supreme Court decision recognizing a state
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couple,6 7 and others refuse to apply the stepparent exception to
same-sex couples. 68 Without legal recognition of the parental
status of both women, lesbian parents' relationships with their
children cannot be secure. Finally and perhaps most importantly,
the welfare of the children may be jeopardized by forcing them to
go through extended litigation and casting doubt upon the
legitimacy of their family structure. 69
2. Trends in the Arguments Proffered by Lesbian Mothers
Seeking Rights to Their Children.
Typically, in cases where the partners are splitting up and
the biological mother is attempting to gain sole custody of the
children, the non-biological mother will advance three arguments
to legitimize her relationship with the children in the eyes of the
law. 70 First, she will argue that the relationship is included in the
common law definition of de facto parenthood, or "psychological
parenting."71  This argument has not been widely successful.7 2
constitutional right to the privileges of marriage for gay and lesbian couples. See
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). This decision was codified to provide
same-sex couples the right to a "civil union," which bestows all the privileges of
marriage upon them. See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves P.A. 91 H. 847. But see Defense
of Marriage Act, Pub L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.) (precluding same-sex marriage as a matter of federal
law, thus preempting any state law to the contrary).
67. Florida and New Hampshire are well known for proscribing adoptions by
homosexuals. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 1997), ("No person eligible to
adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-F:6 (1999) ("[A]n appropriate adoptive family shall not be any
family in which one or more of the adults is a homosexual."); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (West 2000) (authorizing adoption agencies to discriminate
against homosexuals when placing children in adoptive or foster homes); H.R.J.
Res. 35, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (issuing a joint resolution stating the
state legislature's intent to prohibit adoption by homosexuals).
68. See In re Adoption of Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999) (holding that even
though its decision is contrary to the best interests of the child, the state adoption
statute does not contemplate extending the stepparent exception to same-sex
couples and the court would not do so on its own). But see In re M.M.D. & B.H.M.,
662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (applying stepparent exception to a same-sex couple); In
re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (same).
69. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Here,
the sperm donor sued for visitation and won, despite the court psychologist's
testimony that the child did not want a relationship with him and that she felt as
though her family structure was being threatened by him and the court. See id. at
362.
70. See Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and Parenthood- Models for Legal
Recognition of Nontraditional Families, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 127, 141-42 (1997).
71. See id. at 142; see also Kathleen C. v. Lisa W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 51 (Ct.
App. 1999) (finding that non-biological mother exhibited the characteristics of a de
facto parent but still could not claim the rights of a parent without showing
detriment to the child); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (denying non-biological mother standing as "psychological parent");
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Another argument available to the non-biological mother is that of
equitable estoppel. 73 Under equitable estoppel, the non-biological
mother argues that the biological mother fostered and encouraged
a parent-child relationship between the child(ren) and the non-
biological mother, and that she should now be estopped from
denying its existence. 74 The courts have generally declined to
recognize a legal relationship between the non-biological mother
and the child based on this theory. 75 A final argument the non-
biological mother may proffer is that of in loco parentis.76 This
doctrine applies to adults who have acted as parents and will
impose all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood upon
them.77 Again, the courts have refused to extend the application of
this doctrine to grant custody to someone who is, in the eyes of the
law, a "nonparent."78
3. The Most Recent Cases Predict a Promising Future for
Same-sex Parents.
Despite the barrage of precedent against same-sex parents,
some courts have recently gone the other way. In 1996, a
Pennsylvania court granted a non-biological mother standing in
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (denying non-biological
mother standing to sue for visitation by virtue of status as a de facto parent).
72. See supra note 71.
73. See Wray, supra note 70, at 142.
74. Equitable estoppel claims have traditionally been applied to men who have
held children out as their own, then later denied paternity to avoid child support
claims. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Ct. App. 1991). In this
case, the lesbian couple had been "married" and the non-biological mother was
listed as the father of the ART child on his birth certificate. See id. at 214. For
three years after the couple broke up, the mothers shared custody of their son. See
id. Nevertheless, when they no longer agreed about the custody arrangement and
went to court over visitation issues, the court rejected the estoppel theory. See id.
75. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 212; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 (holding
that a parent by estoppel claim brought by same-sex partner is not cognizable to
gain standing in a custody or visitation suit); cf. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618
N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (granting the sperm donor visitation rights
against the will of the mothers and the daughter). In Thomas S., an ART daughter
of a lesbian couple inquired about her father, so the mothers introduced them and
allowed a few supervised visits. Subsequently, the donor sued for visitation. In
granting the sperm donor visitation rights, the court suggested that the mothers
should be estopped from denying his involvement in the child's life after they had
"fostered" the relationship by allowing these few supervised visits. See id. at 362.
76. See Wray, supra note 70, at 142.
77. See id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "in loco parentis" as one charged in
fact with the rights, duties and responsibilities of a parent. BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990). The fatal flaw for mothers arguing this point is
that traditionally, in loco parentis is understood to be temporary in nature and
arises in the absence of a child's natural parents. See id.
78. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
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loco parentis.79 Though courts in other states have subsequently
disagreed with this court's opinion, this case may signify a critical
attitudinal shift. The court stated, "changes in social mores and
increased individual freedom have created a wide spectrum of
arrangements filling the role of the traditional nuclear family,
[and] flexibility in the application of standing principles is
required in order to adapt those principles to the interests of each
particular child."8 0 While such reasoning justifiably creates hope
for the future, as yet it is still an anomaly.
Another exciting development took place in a New Jersey
court when it found that a non-biological mother was the
psychological parent of the couple's child and was thus entitled to
visitation rights.8 1 The court considered numerous factors in
making its decision.8 2 In reaching its conclusion that visitation
rights were warranted, the court gave most weight to three
paramount considerations: (1) the best interests of the children;8 3
(2) evidence of the mothers' intent that both play an active role in
parenting their children;8 4 and (3) recognition that statutory
interpretations of the court must change with the times.85 It
should be noted that New Jersey is a UPA state, but nowhere in
its opinion does the court discuss this fact. Instead, in
emphasizing the need for legislative action, the court quoted an
excerpt from a decision by the California Court of Appeals
interpreting the UIPA.8 6 It specifically pointed out that New
79. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). The court
adopted a flexible definition of in loco parentis that would be largely dependent on
the facts of each individual case. See id. at 1320-2 1. Significantly, the court noted
that the fact that the petitioner was seeking only visitation or partial custody and
not attempting to supplant the role of the biological mother lowered her burden.
See id. at 1320.
80. Id.
81. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
Unfortunately, the court denied the petitioner standing to sue for joint custody.
See id.
82. The court considered factors such as the role both mothers played before
and during the pregnancy; petitioner's involvement in the children's lives in the
first few weeks following the birth of the twins; the fact that the affairs of both
mothers were intertwined; and a psychologist's report to the court after speaking
with both children. See id. at 15-17.
83. See id. at 20.
84. See id. at 15.
85. See id. at 19.
86. The court quotes the opinion of Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212,
219 (Ct. App. 1991), in which that court clearly felt trapped under the UPA. See id.
It stated:
[b]y deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex social and
policy ramifications far beyond the facts of the particular case, we are not
telling the parties that the issues they raise are unworthy of legal
recognition. To the contrary, we intend only to illustrate the limitations of
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Jersey would not do injustice while waiting on the legislature.8 7
The court found that denying "children of same-sex partners...
the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second
parent serves no legitimate state interest."8 8
In another recent and revolutionary case regarding lesbian
mothers, a San Francisco judge granted a couple's petition for
legal recognition as co-parents. 89 The facts of this case were
unique in that one mother donated the eggs, and after their
fertilization by a presumably anonymous donor, the other mother
carried the fetus to term.90 Judge Donna Hitchens referred to the
UPA in deciding that although gestation is one means of
establishing legal parentage, it is insufficient on its own.91 Rather
than focusing on the biological composition of the child, the court
applied an intent-based test derived in principle from cases
involving surrogate mothers. 92 As a result, the court found that
both mothers intended to raise the child as their own, and thus
both would become the legally recognized parents under the
UPA. 93
Although the judges in each of these cases dealt with slightly
different fact patterns and reached comparable results through
slightly different reasoning, there is a common thread that links
each case. In each situation, the judge considered the intent of the
parties at the time of conception in determining who the child's
true parents were. If the UPA included an intent-based standard
for determining parentage for lesbian mothers creating their
families through ART, justice could be done, and the long-standing
policies of "legitimizing' every child would be fulfilled.
the courts in fashioning a comprehensive solution to such a complex and
socially significant issue.
V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See In Re McAllister & Subak, No. FL032006 (Cal. Super., San Fran. Co.,
May 24, 1999) (unpublished opinion), discussed in California Superior Court
Grants Legal Parent Status to Lesbian Couple Prior to Child's Birth, LESBIAN/GAY
LAW NOTES (LeGaL Found. of the Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y.),
Summer 1999, at 110.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) and In re the
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
93. See id. at 111.
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D. The UPA's Proposed Revisions Fail to Address the Non-
traditional Family.
In drafting the 1999 proposed revisions to the UPA, NCCUSL
was clearly aware of the technological and societal changes
affecting the modern family structure. 94 The prefatory note refers
to the inconsistencies in case law among UPA states, recent topics
of litigation that the revisions attempt to resolve, and the two
more recent (but unpopular) uniform acts addressing parentage
that are incorporated into the revisions.95 Section 5 of the 1973
UPA was the only section addressing ART.96 In the proposed
revisions, the section has been renumbered and expanded. ART is
now addressed in Article 8 and follows a format similar to the
original version. 97
The first two sections address the issue of who is the father of
an ART child.98 As in the 1973 UPA, the proposed revisions
94. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, at 1-2 (Proposed Revisions 1999),
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upal099.htm (Oct. 1999).
95. See id. at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.
96. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973); supra note 38 and
accompanying text (discussing the language in section 5 of the 1973 UPA).
97. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Article 8 (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm (Oct. 1999):
Section 801. Husband's Paternity of Child Resulting from Assisted
Reproduction. If a husband consents to assisted reproduction pursuant to
Section 802, he is deemed to be the father of any child resulting from: (1)
the artificial insemination of his wife; (2) providing his sperm to fertilize a
donor's eggs that are placed in the uterus of his wife; or (3) the implanting
of an embryo in the uterus of his wife, whether the donated embryo is the
result of separate donations of sperm and eggs or the donated embryo is
created for the purpose of assisted reproduction.
Section 802. Consent to Assisted Reproduction. (a) Each participant in
assisted reproduction must consent to that participation, including, as
applicable: (1) a husband and wife; (2) the donor of the sperm if other than
the husband; [and] (3) the donor of eggs if other than the wife[; and (4) a
woman who intends to be the gestational mother on behalf of the intended
parents]. (b) The consent must: (1) be in writing; and (2) be signed by the
participant. (c) Failure to comply with subsection (b) does not: (1) preclude
a finding that the husband is the father of a child bern to his wife if the
wife and husband treat the child as their child in all respects and jointly
represent their parenthood to others; or (2) confer rights or impose duties
on a donor as a mother or father of the child if the donation of reproductive
material was made under circumstances demonstrating an intent that the
assisted reproduction would not impose parental responsibility upon
anyone other than the husband and wife.
Section 806. Parental Status of Donor. (a) A donor of sperm is not the
father of a child conceived through assisted reproduction if the mother is:
(1) married and her husband has consented to the assisted reproduction; or
(2) unmarried at the time of conception, unless the donor and the mother
of the child acknowledge the donor's paternity pursuant to Article 3 ....




operate under the assumption that the woman being inseminated
is married. 99 Just like under section 5, the husband must consent
to his wife's insemination to be considered the natural father. 100
And just like under section 5, paternity is established in the
husband even if his consent does not meet statutory
requirements.10 1 The revisions also state that an insufficient
consent by the husband does not grant parental rights to the
donor, assuming there is evidence of the husband and wife's intent
to parent the child themselves. 102 The revisions proceed to cover
situations where paternity of an ART child may be disputed or
denied completely, as in situations where the husband denies that
he consented to the procedure,10 3 where the donor has died before
the implantation of an embryo or assisted reproduction has taken
place, 104 and where the marriage has dissolved before the
procedure has taken place. 05 The most notable change in this
section is the omission of the "licensed physician" requirement.
Due to the provisions in both the 1973 UPA and the proposed
revisions that allow intent to govern parentage for married
couples, it is difficult to see how this omission will have any great
impact.
The final section of Article 8, section 806, is the only section
that considers the possibility that the recipient of donated sperm
is unmarried. 10 6 This section prevents the sperm donor from
claiming paternity of an ART child conceived by an unmarried
woman unless the two establish the man's paternity "pursuant to
Article 3."107 Article 3 of the proposed revisions allows both
biological parents of the ART child to take formal steps to register
the donor as the legal father of the child.'05 This provision could
effectively remedy the situation where the sperm donor later
claims paternity rights against the will of the mother. In doing so,
it still omits any discussion of who is to be (or may be) considered a
second parent to an ART child born to an unmarried woman.
99. See id. at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.
100. See id. at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ibrary/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.
101. See id. § 802, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.
The UPA requires the consent be written and signed by each participant. See id.
102. See id. at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.
103. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm (Oct. 1999).
104. See id. § 804, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulcdupa/upa1099.htm.
105. See id. § 805, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.
106. See id. § 806, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.
107. Id. at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm.




Interestingly, the intent of the parties is relevant only in those
provisions dealing with the insemination of a married woman.
III. Implementing an Intent-based Standard to Determine
the Parentage of ART Children Would Resolve the
Current Inequities Imposed by the UPA.
If NCCUSL would incorporate an intent-based standard into
its provisions governing all instances of ART, courts would be
capable of reaching equitable decisions in these matters with
sufficient statutory justification. Under the existing draft of the
proposed revisions, no two members of the same sex can legally co-
parent a child. This blanket preclusion of same-sex parentage
ignores the reality of many families. Many children do in fact
have same-sex parents, and the laws must reflect that for the
benefit of these children as well as their parents.
A. The "'Licensed Physician" Requirement of the 1973 UPA
Imposes Undue Burdens on Lesbian Mothers.
NCCUSL provided no explanation for its decision to include
in the 1973 UPA the requirement of a licensed physician's
supervision of the insemination. However, its inclusion seems to
be based on the common perception that artificial insemination is
a medical procedure that a professional must perform. 109 The
reality is that artificial insemination is an easy procedure that
many people prefer to perform in the privacy of their own home."10
Some women choose a known donor based, at least in part, on
privacy issues. One mother argued that the physician
requirement offended her "sense of privacy and reproductive
autonomy, might result in burdensome costs to some women, and
might interfere with a woman's desire to conduct the procedure in
a comfortable environment such as her own home.""' To date,
none of the states that have enacted the UPA have seen fit to
109. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Ct. App. 1986)
(reasoning that by maintaining the licensed physician requirement when adopting
the UPA, the legislature was concerned with how the semen was to be obtained,
how the procedure was to be performed, the health history of the donor and the
desire to make the procedure a formal and documented one).
110. See id. at 535. In addition to privacy concerns, many women may choose to
self-inseminate for financial reasons. Conception through professionally
administered artificial insemination can be extremely expensive, often costing up to
tens of thousands of dollars, especially if the procedure needs to be performed
multiple times before the recipient becomes pregnant. When compared with this
expense, private self-insemination is an attractive, low- or no-cost alternative. See
Harlow, supra note 16, at 182-85.
111. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
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change the "licensed physician" provision to reflect the reality of
the procedure and the preferences of those who utilize it.112
An additional consideration is the discrimination unmarried
women face from medical professionals who perform ART.
113
Many physicians expressly refuse to perform ART on unmarried
women. When surveyed, physicians cited such factors as marital
status, psychological immaturity, and homosexuality as reasons
for their refusal. 114 In 1995, three states attempted to pass
legislation limiting or prohibiting unmarried women's access to
ART. 115 In light of this blatant discrimination, it is not surprising
that women opt to conceive in a supportive and nurturing
environment in the privacy of their homes.
B. The 'Married Woman" Requirement Unconstitutionally
Differentiates Between Unmarried and Married Women.
All women wishing to conceive through ART are similarly
situated; therefore, it is unconstitutional to treat them differently
by statute.11 6  The Supreme Court has long held that it is
unconstitutional to differentiate between married and unmarried
persons with respect to procreation.1 17 By requiring that women
conceiving through ART be married, the UPA discriminates
against not only all unmarried women who wish to have a child,
but also and especially against lesbians who cannot legally
marry. 118  Although motherhood by unmarried women is
traditionally looked upon as accidental in the eyes of the law, it is
112. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301, 302 (1973).
113. See Harlow, supra note 14 at 174-75.
114. See id. at 188.
115. See id. at 175 & n.8 (citing S. Con. Res. 75, 18th State Leg. (Haw. 1995); S.
File No. 1785, 79th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 1995); H.B. No. 2303, 68th Leg. (Or. 1995)).
The Hawaii legislature requested that the Department of Health investigate
whether ART should be available only to infertile married couples, which would not
only prohibit unmarried women's access, but also exclude lesbian couples
completely. See id. Similar legislation was proposed in Minnesota, which would
have required a male to claim paternity prior to the insemination. See id. The
Oregon statute was proffered to totally prohibit ART for single women. See id.
116. Different treatment for married and unmarried women who are similarly
situated violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, which held that
unmarried people have a fundamental right of access to contraception, the Court
reasoned that the decision whether or not to reproduce is so personal that the state
cannot regulate it. See id. at 438-39. In addition, the Court has held that the right
to reproduce is a fundamental right. See infra note 126.
117. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
118. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.) (precluding same-sex marriage as
a matter of federal law, thus preempting any state law to the contrary).
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time the law recognize that this is not always the case. 119 Families
formed through ART are generally well planned, whether the
biological mother is single, married, or in a committed
relationship. 120
In Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 121 the mothers argued that by
allowing the sperm donor to intervene in their family, the court
was unconstitutionally denying their rights to family autonomy
and procreative choice. 122 Though the court rejected their claim, it
did so erroneously. The court's rejection of the argument that the
mothers had a right to family autonomy was based on its refusal to
recognize the mothers and their children as a "family."'123 Other
courts, however, have recognized gay couples without children as
constituting a "family."124 It follows that gay parents, like all
other parents, constitute a family. The court also stated that the
UPA did not inhibit procreative choice because it did not proscribe
self-inseminations, it merely regulated the consequences. 125 To
the contrary, the UPA does effectively deny unmarried women
procreative choice by removing the elements of privacy and
autonomy from the procedure. Each of these factors violates
women's constitutional rights. 126
In addition to being unnecessary and unconstitutional, the
"married woman" requirement of the 1973 UPA is socially
inefficient. State legislatures, as well as Congress, often craft laws
around a policy promoting marriage. 127 The merits of this policy in
119. See Donovan, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
120. See Abigail Garner, The Changing Face of Parenting, LAVENDER, Feb. 11-
24, 2000, at 41, 47-49; Harlow, supra note 16, at 174-75; Nancy D. Polikoff, This
Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459,
465-66 (1997).
121. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
122. See id. at 536-37.
123. See id. at 536. The court stated that because the child had developed a
"social relationship" with the sperm donor, the donor was as much a part of the
child's family as either of his mothers who had raised him since birth. See id.
124. See ALEXANDER, supra note 59, at 103 (citing Braschi v. Stahl Ass'n Co., 543
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that gay partners constitute a family for the
purposes of rent control)).
125. See Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
126. The right to privacy and family autonomy, including the decision to have a
child or not, has long been viewed as a constitutional right by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating that the zone of privacy
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment extends to family relationships and
procreation) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), for the right to
privacy in procreation, and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), for the
right to privacy in family relationships).
127. In the recent news, we have seen federal legislation such as the Defense of
Marriage Act and controversy over whether to change the tax code to eliminate the
so-called "marriage penalty." See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199,
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general are debatable, but as applied to women seeking ART, the
policy is completely out of place. As a general rule, women seeking
to conceive through ART have contemplated and prepared for the
pregnancy and child;128 requiring a marriage to verify this is
nonsensical.
Unmarried women who participate in ART are choosing to
become mothers either independently or with an intended co-
parent.129 By over-regulating these decisions, socially unfavorable
consequences will surely result. If the biological parents and
intended co-parents were able to enter into a legally binding
contract regarding future obligations to a child, children could
have more stable and predictable futures, at least regarding the
identity of their parents. 130
C. As a Result of the UPA's Requirements of Marriage and
Physician Involvement, Courts Have Applied a Double
Standard to Sperm Donors and Lesbian Mothers Seeking
Visitation or Custody Rights.
In the eighteen states that currently follow the LPA, the non-
biological mother of a lesbian couple has no legal claim to her ART
child if the couple who planned for, conceived and raised the child
ever separates. 131 In contrast, the sperm donor may intervene at
any time to establish paternity rights, regardless of any agreement
he had with the mothers prior to conception.132 In the case of the
110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.). In
Minnesota, the state legislature passed an anti-palimony statute with the primary
motive of promoting marriages. See Telephone Interview by David W. Selden with
Judge (formerly Senator) Davies, Minnesota Court of Appeals (Sept. 20, 1999);
MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-.076 (1999).
128. See, e.g., Garner, supra note 120, at 47-49 (describing the case of an
unmarried woman who planned to have a child through ART since she was a teen);
see also Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that
mothers did carefully plan conception, pregnancy and child rearing).
129. See Donovan, supra note 20.
130. Cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(d), 9B U.L.A. 303 (1973) (stating that any
agreement between a putative father and the mother does not bar an action to
determine paternity).
131. See, e.g., Kathleen C. v. Lisa W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 51 (Ct. App. 1999)
(denying that former partner had standing to sue for custody or visitation under
the UPA because she could not show that the natural mother was unfit). But see
supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing cases with differing outcomes
on this issue).
132. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533-35, 537-38 (Ct.
App. 1986) (awarding sperm donor parental rights because the lesbian mother did
not utilize a physician for transfer of semen as required by the UPA); see also C.M.
v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824-25 (Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. Cumberland County, N.J. 1977)
(awarding paternity to sperm donor against the intent of the mother by refusing to
make any distinction between artificial insemination and conception by
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sperm donor, courts purportedly rely on the best interests of the
child standard, 133 citing the popular idea that it is in every child's
interest to have both a mother and a father. 3 4 In the cases in
which the mothers are fighting over custody, the courts have not
considered the best interests of the child, stating simply that the
non-biological mother has no statutory standing to sue.1 35
1. "This Child Does Have Two Mothers... and a Sperm
Donor with Visitation."136
Under the current version of the UPA, any putative father
can seek a determination of paternity in court that gives him
visitation or custody rights to the child. 137 Naturally, private
administration of ART necessitates the use of a known sperm
donor, who may make this same claim later on. Case law has
demonstrated that lesbians who conceive through ART run the
risk of losing parental rights completely,138 or they may be forced
to cooperate in visitation arrangements with a sperm donor who
suddenly wants to participate in the child's life. 139
intercourse).
133. The best interests of the child are often indeterminate. Some states have
codified a standard; others have left it to the courts. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 233-37, 255-56, 261-64 (1975), quoted in D. KELLY
WEISBERG & SusAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 816-18 (1998). The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act requires a court to consider the wishes of the
parents and the child; the interaction of the child with his or her parent(s) and
siblings; the child's adjustment to home, school and community; and the mental
and physical health of all the parties involved. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE
ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987), quoted in WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra, at 818.
134. See, e.g., C.M., 377 A.2d at 824 (awarding paternity to sperm donor against
the intent of the mother by refusing to make any distinction between artificial
insemination and conception by intercourse).
135. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-19 (Ct. App. 1991)
(awarding sole legal custody to biological mother).
136. See Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers... and a Sperm
Donor With Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1996).
137. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 302 (1973).
138. Parenting guides for lesbians have indicated that they feel vulnerable to
attack, especially by a biological father wanting to interfere in their family life.
Since the 1970s, lesbian mothers have had to endure long and expensive court
battles in a homophobic judicial system to retain custody of their children. Even in
today's judicial climate, attorneys advise lesbian clients to use an anonymous
sperm donor and have the procedure performed by a physician to protect
themselves from future attack. See Bernstein, supra note 138, at 22; see also
Symposium, Lavender Law: Getting Connected, NLGLA Seattle (1999) (describing
sample pleadings to protect gay couples).
139. See C.M., 377 A.2d at 821. A New Jersey court, governed by the UPA,
awarded paternity rights to a known sperm donor after the mother self-
inseminated. The court seems to have based its decision largely on policy grounds,
stating that courts generally prefer "the requirement that a child be provided with
a father as well as a mother." Id. at 824. In addition, since it is allegedly in the
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In the aforementioned leading case from California, Jhordan
C. v. Mary K,140 the court relied on the fact that no licensed
physician was involved in the artificial insemination to grant the
known sperm donor visitation rights.' 4 ' The court held that the
child's two mothers had "failed to take advantage of this statutory
basis for preclusion of paternity" by conducting the artificial
insemination without a physician present.142 The California
legislature had adopted the UPA provision regarding artificial
insemination almost verbatim, 143 and the court interpreted the
licensed physician requirement as a limitation on the application
of the statute. 144 Consequently, the court held that the rights and
obligations of paternity must be assigned to the father regardless
of the method by which the child was conceived. 145
The court turned to the history of the UPA to justify its strict
application of the licensed physician requirement. 146 It relied on
three basic propositions. First, the court found that because the
phrase "licensed physician" did not appear in any of the discussion
drafts of the UPA but was included in the final one, it must have
been consciously added by the drafters of the UPA.147 Second, the
court found that there are legitimate reasons for the state to
encourage the involvement of a licensed physician in these
procedures, such as screening the donor for any hereditary
diseases. 148 Finally, the court stated that the involvement of a
"professional third party such as a physician" could serve to
formalize the relationship and prevent misunderstandings bound
to arise otherwise.149 Though the court acknowledged the mothers'
arguments against physician involvement, it awarded visitation to
the sperm donor largely due to the fact that the state legislature
best interests of the child to have two parents, the court "will not make any
distinction between a child conceived naturally or artificially." Id. at 825; accord
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531 (Ct. App. 1986) (awarding paternity
privileges to the sperm donor per the UPA based on the fact that the women
contesting paternity opted not to utilize a physician).
140. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
141. See id. at 531.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 533-34 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1999) (omitting the
qualifier "married")).




148. See id. The court opined that the UPA drafters must have shared its
concern since the comment following cited a law review article cautioning about the
dangers of artificial insemination. See id.
149. Id. at 535.
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had included the licensed physician requirement. 50 In reaching
its decision, the court ignored the fact that the mothers and the
sperm donor had in fact come to an agreement prior to conception
regarding the contact he would have with the child. The court also
ignored the terms of this agreement. The presumption that
physician involvement somehow leads to eternal understanding
among the parties is implicit in the opinion, though illogical and
unexplained. Finally, the argument that the licensed physician
requirement must have been consciously added by the drafters
since it only appeared in the final draft is pure speculation and
easily refuted.
The UPA discriminates against not only all lesbians, but all
unmarried women generally, as evidenced by a New Jersey court
that reached a similar result under a comparable set of
circumstances.' 51 C.C. was a single woman who wanted to
conceive a child through ART.' 52 She asked a friend, C.M., to
provide the sperm. 53 C.M. and C.C. were referred to a sperm
bank, but they were refused access to the facilities. 154 Thereafter,
the insemination took place in C.C.'s home without the assistance
of a physician. 155 The two were in a dating relationship at the
time of conception, but the relationship ended a few months
later.156 Once C.M. realized that C.C. had no intention of allowing
him access to the child, he brought an action to establish paternity
and visitation rights. 15 7 According to C.C., there was never any
mention of co-parenting the child.158 Without referring to the
UPA, the court found in favor of C.M. 159
The court's reasoning in this case turned on how it framed
the issue before it: "whether a man is any less a father because he
provides the semen by a method different from that normally
used."'1 0 With this issue as the baseline for its reasoning, the
150. See id.




154. See id. It is unclear from the opinion exactly why the couple was refused
access. See id.
155. See id. at 821-22.
156. See id. at 822.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 825.
160. Id. at 824. It should be noted that this statement by the court conflicts with
the UPA. If the intended parents of an ART child are married, the current UPA
contains a clause to establish the legal paternity of the father even if the statutory
provisions are not met. If the parents are not married, it is considerably more
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court likened the circumstances to natural conception. 16 1 The
court found that whether or not a child conceived through natural
conception was the product of a marital relationship, the "donor" is
the father.162 Likewise, whether the biological parents of an ART
child are married has no impact on the court's determination of
paternity. 163
Significantly, the court brushed aside the objections of C.C. in
its opinion. 164 Although there was a factual dispute as to their
agreement prior to conception, the court did not bother to
investigate it.165 The court also stated that policy favors a child
having a mother and a father. 66 "It is in a child's best interests to
have two parents whenever possible."'167 Although the court did
not mention the UPA in its opinion, its decision is entirely
consistent with section 5(b). Because the UPA does not address
who shall be determined to be the father of a child in these
situations, the court may assign the rights and obligations of
paternity to the donor. The mother has no rights under the
statute.
Cases in non-UPA states have generally reached the same
result.168 One New York case often referenced by commentators
pointing out the flaws in the UPA and similar statutes is Thomas
S. v. Robin Y169 In that case, the sperm donor waited nine years
difficult to establish paternity or parental responsibilities in the intended co-
parent, especially in cases where the intended co-parent is the same sex as the
natural parent.
161. See id. at 824-25 (stating that "the court has found C.M. to be the natural
father ....").
162. See id. at 824.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 821-24.
165. See id. at 822.
166. See id. at 824.
167. Id. at 825.
168. The New York Statute addressing the issue of legitimacy by artificial
insemination states:
Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination
performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the
consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the
legitimate, natural child of the husband and his wife for all purposes.
The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both
the husband and wife and the physician who performs the technique shall
certify that he had rendered the service.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 73 (McKinney 1999). Substantively, this statute is not
different from the UPA since it implicitly requires that a woman attempting to
conceive through ART be married and utilize the services of "persons duly
authorized to practice medicine." Id.
169. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994); see also Bernstein, supra note 138, at 27
(discussing the problems of granting parental rights to sperm donors); Marc E.
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after the birth of the ART child to establish his paternity. 170 The
court, governed by a law quite similar to UPA section 5,171 granted
the sperm donor an order of filiation 17 2 and remanded the
proceedings to determine visitation rights. 173 The court in this
case recognized that visitation with the sperm donor would
probably not be in the best interests of the child, according to the
court psychiatrist. 174 Nevertheless, it entered the order of filiation
enabling the donor to seek custody or visitation over the objections
of the mothers as well as the child. 17
5
The common thread that ties all these cases together is that
in each circumstance, the court insisted on providing the child
with two legally recognized parents. In one respect, NCCUSL has
apparently achieved its goal of "identifying the person against
whom [a child's] rights may be asserted"'176 by finding a "father" for
each of the children in these cases. However, in light of cases
demonstrating how courts reach beyond both logic and fact to deny
lesbians parental rights in favor of sperm donors, it is time for
NCCUSL to consider that it was striving toward the wrong goal.
Determining paternity is not always the ultimate goal, as
paternity alone does not dispose of controversy over parental
rights, especially in the context of ART. Many women choose to
have children without relying on the continued participation of the
sperm donor. The fact that women choose ART as opposed to
traditional conception is per se evidence of this choice. The sperm
donor should be recognized as a legal parent of a child he assisted
Elovitz, Reforming the Law to Respect Families Created by Lesbian and Gay People,
3 J.L. & POLY 431, 431-33 (1995) (using facts from Thomas S. to offer proposals to
respect gay and lesbian families); Vickie L. Henry, A Tale of Three Women: A
Survey of the Rights and Responsibilities of Unmarried Wonmen Who Conceive by
Alternative Insemination and a Model for Legislative Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED.
285, 287-300 (1993) (examining the lack of protection of lesbian families).
170. See Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
171. See supra note 168. It should be noted that the court relied on two other
Domestic Relations Acts, neither of which dealt with ART children. One statute
authorizes the court to enter an order of filiation declaring paternity for a male
party found to be the father of the child. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 542 (McKinney
1999). Since the biological mother and the sperm donor in this case had entered an
oral agreement that the donor should not assume a parental role in the ART child's
life, the court also relied on section 516 which addresses contracting of parental
rights. See id. § 516. Since the parties had not obtained court approval of their
agreement, it was not enforceable to prevent the donor from claiming paternity
rights. See id.
172. Filiation is a judicial determination of paternity. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 628 (6th ed. 1990).
173. See Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
174. See id. at 358.
175. See id. at 356-62.
176. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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in creating only if it was agreed prior to conception that he could
be. The reason the two biological "parents" are engaging in ART
rather than common conception is to avoid the intimacy that
comes with, inter alia, playing parental roles side by side.
2. Sperm Donors Are Also Susceptible to a Paternity Action
Against Them Under the Current Version of the UPA.
Another consequence of the UPA's failure to address the use
of ART by unmarried women is the liability that could haunt a
sperm donor. Not only does the UPA create a set of presumptions
to determine paternity, 177 it permits the appropriate state agency
to initiate a paternity proceeding if no father is presumed. 178 It
also nullifies any pre-conception agreement between the mother
and biological father regarding the parenting role (if any) each will
play in the child's life. 179 Thus, the statute does not necessarily
protect even anonymous donors. 80 Under the UPA, it is possible
for a state agency to initiate a proceeding to determine the
paternity of a child.181 With all the resources available to the
state, even an anonymous donor's identity could be uncovered, and
he could be assigned all the rights and obligations of paternity 8 2
This is obviously detrimental to sperm donors who never had any
intention of becoming legal fathers to the children of women they
have never met. It is also detrimental to women wishing to
become pregnant through ART, as the threat of being assigned
parental liability will likely deter men from donating sperm
altogether.
D. The Double Standard Rears its Ugly Head: Courts Deny
Two Parents to Children Whose Parents Are Women.
Although men are frequently assigned parental status
against their will and in spite of being absent from their child's
life, it has not yet been widely accepted for both mothers in a
lesbian couple to be recognized as a child's legal parents in any
177. See supra notes 31-33.
178. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(c) 9B U.L.A. 303 (1973).
179. See id. § 6(d).
180. See Donovan, supra note 20, at 221.
181. Section 6 of the UPA allows "[any interested party" to bring a claim to
establish paternity. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(b)-(c) 9B U.L.A. 302-03 (1973).
These provisions thereby permit any state agency to bring an action to establish
paternity for any reason, though most of the cases involve a child on public
assistance. See Donovan, supra note 20, at 211-13. The state can initiate these
proceedings regardless of the contrary wishes of the mother or child. See id. at 214.
182. See Donovan, supra note 20, at 215.
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circumstance. 8 3 Denying legal recognition to both mothers has a
variety of consequences. Most often litigated are the custody
battles that ensue when a lesbian couple separates after having
children.18 4 The typical situation involves couples who together
discuss, plan and select a donor for the future child.18 5 One
partner is then inseminated, carries the child to term and stays
home to raise it.186 The other partner works to support the
family. 8 7 If the couple eventually separates, the partner who was
not inseminated has no legal claim to the child. 188
Despite the general policy favoring two parents for every
child, courts have been unwilling to assign two parents when their
only option is two women.189 As a result, when lesbian
relationships involving children end, one mother is left with
nothing-no custody rights, no visitation and no support
obligations. Meanwhile, the child is left with only one parent. It
is hard to imagine that these circumstances are in the best
interests of the child.
One case out of California demonstrates the predicament. In
Curiale v. Reagan,190 a lesbian couple decided to have a child
together.1 91 During the couple's five-year relationship, Reagan
was artificially inseminated and gave birth to a child, whom the
couple agreed they would raise together. 92  During the
183. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
184. See Kathleen C. v. Lisa W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 51 (Ct. App. 1999) (denying
that former partner had standing to sue for custody or visitation under the UPA
because she could not show that the natural mother was unfit); Nancy S. v. Michele
G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216-17 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that because partner was
not the natural mother, had not adopted the children, and was not legally married
to her former partner, the UPA prevented her from establishing a legally
cognizable parent-child relationship); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 108-
10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (non-UPA state holding that it is necessary to show
that custody with biological parent would be detrimental to the child in order to
place him with non-biological parent); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29
(N.Y. 1991) (non-UPA court holding that the word "parent" in the statute granting
standing to sue for visitation foreclosed any claim by biological mother's former
partner).
185. See Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521 (Ct. App. 1990); see also
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (describing a case where lesbians planned family
together but later separated); Wray, supra note 70, at 136-37 (discussing legal
changes necessary to protect lesbian families).
186. See Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521; see also Wray, supra note 70, at 136-37
(discussing legal changes necessary to protect lesbian families).
187. See Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
188. See id.
189. See supra note 184 (detailing cases in which non-biological lesbian mothers
were denied parental rights).
190. 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990).




relationship, Curiale supported the family financially and Reagan
cared for the child.193 When the couple split up, the mothers
entered into a voluntary joint custody agreement, and Curiale
continued to provide financial support.194 Approximately eighteen
months later, Reagan denied Curiale access to the child, and
Curiale brought an action to establish de facto parent status. 195
The court held that the UPA was inapplicable in this situation,
due to the fact that the defendant was indisputably the biological
mother of the child.196 As a result, the non-biological mother
lacked standing to bring suit to establish joint custody,
guardianship or dependency. 19v
While Curiale demonstrates how courts typically deny the
non-biological mother of an ART child any legal recognition as a
parent, an anomalous New York case reached a different result.
In Karin T. v. Michael T, 198 the non-biological mother was
assigned support obligations regarding the ART children she and
her partner had raised.199  When the couple broke up, the
biological mother sued her former partner for support obligations
under the Uniform Support of Dependents Act.200 In response, the
non-biological mother argued that she had no legal obligation to
the children; she had never adopted them, and furthermore, as a
woman, she could not be the biological parent of the children. 20 1 In
spite of the lack of legal foundation, the court held her responsible
on equitable grounds.20 2 It focused the bulk of its reasoning on the
fact that the respondent lived as a man, "dressed in men's clothing
and obtained employment that she regarded as 'men's work."'20 3
The respondent attempted to deny status as a "parent" as defined
by statute, but the court found that she fit the definition both
because of her relationship with the children and the other
mother's reliance on her commitment.204
In effect, the court in Karin T. reached the right result for the




196. See id. at 522.
197. See id.
198. 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. Monroe County 1985).
199. See id. at 784.
200. See id. at 781.
201. See id. at 784.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 781.
204. See id. at 784.
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that the respondent lived as a "man," but rather that the
respondent was in fact a parent to her children and should have
been responsible to them, regardless of the success or failure of her
relationship with the co-parent. Indeed, despite the superficially
favorable result of recognizing a lesbian as a non-biological co-
parent, the court's reliance on the fact that respondent held herself
out as "a man" is ironically consistent with the practice of courts
routinely reaching to find a "male" parent for every child. 205 It
seems clear from the facts of this case that the mothers at one
time intended to raise the children together. Though the court did
not explicitly consider intent, it should have been a primary factor
in assigning parental rights and obligations.
With the exception of Karin T., lesbian mothers are
repeatedly denied legal recognition as parents. 20 6 Courts tend to
recognize the injustice in their decisions, but generally maintain
that it is the role of the legislature to provide a remedy.20 7 It is in
only exceptional and anomalous situations that lesbian co-parents
are given legal rights and recognition as parents on an equal basis
with heterosexual parents.208 Until state legislatures amend
existing laws and thereby provide the courts with a clear
framework allowing parentage based on intent rather than mere
biology, courts will continue to deny lesbian mothers rights to their
children, and correspondingly, rights of the children to have two
legal parents.
205. See supra notes 131-176 and accompanying text (discussing how courts
grant parental rights to sperm donors).
206. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-19 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that a lesbian partner who was not the natural or adoptive parent was not
a parent within the meaning of the UPA).
207. See Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990); accord
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text
(detailing cases in which courts express frustration with decision yet defer to the
legislature).
208. In at least one UPA state, the legislature has provided a statutory remedy
after such a case was decided. After the decision in C.C. v. C.M., 377 A.2d 821
(Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. Cumberland County, N.J. 1977) (see supra notes 151-166 and
accompanying text), the New Jersey legislature enacted a statute providing that "a
donor of semen to someone other than his wife has no parental rights to a child
conceived through artificial insemination unless the donor and the woman have
entered into a written contract to the contrary." In re R.C., Minor Child, 775 P.2d
27, 32 n.6 (Colo. 1989) (citing N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:17-44(b) (1988)).
2001]
Law and Inequality
1. By Failing to Legally Recognize that Some ART Children
Have Two Parents of the Same Sex, the Law is Denying
These Children Their Right to Support from Two
Individuals.
If a lesbian couple with ART children does separate, not only
does one parent stand to lose all claims to the children, but the
children also lose all the privileges that come with having two
legally recognized parents. 209 Despite the possibility that former
partners can negotiate an acceptable custody or visitation
arrangement just as heterosexual parents do, in the eyes of the
law, ART children of lesbian parents have only one parent. 210 This
means that the children have only one source of financial support;
they can inherit through intestacy from only one parent; and,
should anything happen to their biological mother, they run the
risk of being placed for adoption or into foster care, despite any
actions taken by the non-biological mother. 211 Not only does this
put the children at a disadvantage, but it violates the public policy
the courts have consistently identified-that "[ilt is in a child's
best interests to have two parents whenever possible."212
2. Help is on the Way? The Dubious Effects of the Proposed
Revisions.
When drafting the proposed revisions in October of 1999,
NCCUSL was responding to a host of problems states had
encountered in interpreting and implementing the UPA. The
prefatory note and the reporter's notes throughout the text are
littered with references to litigation that has arisen under the
UPA and NCCUSL's goals of supplying a remedy to common
cases.
2 13
209. See supra notes 24, 30, 59-61 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (holding lesbian non-biological
mother a "nonparent").
211. If the biological mother becomes incapable of caring for her children for any
reason, the non-biological mother has no stronger claim to adopt or provide foster
care for them than a third-party stranger does. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text. In some states, the non-biological mother will even be
prevented from adopting the children by statute. See supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
212. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. Cumberland County,
N.J. 1977); see also Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214-19 (making it clear that the
non-biological mother is not a parent under the law and refusing to provide another
legal parent for the child); Kathleen C. v. Lisa W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 50-51 (Ct.
App. 1999) (same).
213. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm (Oct. 1999). "[Ihe binding
effect [of a paternity judgment] is very confused in the case law.... This section is
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a. The Drafters'Elimination of the "Licensed Physician" and
"Married Woman" Requirements Will Result in Legal
Protection for Unmarried Mothers and Sperm Donors.
Fortunately, NCCUSL did address the "licensed physician"
requirement that had been a problem under section 5 of the 1973
UPA.214 By omitting this requirement for women who participate
in ART and creating a presumption that the sperm donor is not
the father of the child, the proposed revisions have indeed
provided a remedy to one problem under current law that
diminishes the rights of unmarried mothers-by-choice. 215 The
presumption that the sperm donor is not the legal father of the
child will benefit all unmarried mothers-by-choice by precluding
the possibility that the donor may intrude into the child's life and
destroy the familial relationships the child has developed. 216
In addition, the "married woman" requirement has
disappeared from the revised statute. While this may work to
diminish the discrimination lesbians suffer under the proposed
Act, it does not eliminate it.217 The revisions still discuss ART as if
it happens only between a husband and wife. 218 In the one
provision that does raise the possibility that an unmarried woman
could participate in ART, the 1999 UPA defines only who is not the
father.219 Until the UPA addresses the reality that many children
to avoid evidentiary problems, such as the finding that the report of the results of
genetic testing is not admissible in a paternity case ...." Id. § 503, reporter's note.
214. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 140-167 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537-38 (Ct. App. 1986)
(awarding visitation rights to sperm donor over objection of both lesbian co-
parents). Here, the sperm donor was intervening in the child's life over the
objections of his mothers. See id. The court found that the donor was also entitled
to visitation with the child, but not to any input into decisions regarding the child's
welfare. See id.; see also Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994)
(demonstrating the damage an intervening sperm donor can cause a child). In
Thomas S., the court recognized that the child felt that any relationship with her
biological father would necessarily threaten her relationship with her mothers. See
id. In addition, a court-appointed psychologist reported that the child was
concerned that visitation with her father would "undermine the legitimacy of her
perception of the family unit." Id. at 358. Nevertheless, the sperm donor was
granted an order of filiation, a first step in his pursuit of visitation privileges. See
id. at 361.
217. Heterosexual women can get married and gain statutory protection, but
lesbians cannot. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.).





have parents of the same sex, it will continue to fail in its attempt
to justly establish parentage. 220
Section 806 of the 1999 UPA establishes that the sperm
donor is not the father of an ART child unless he and the mother
so agree and register his paternity status accordingly. 22 1 It does
not establish who the co-parent should be, if any, with the
unmarried mother. In light of the rest of Article 8, this section is
flawed. Both the 1973 and the 1999 versions of the UPA allow for
the determination of paternity based on intent when a married
woman engages in ART, whether or not she has complied with the
statute.2 2 It does not do the same for unmarried women. For
married women, the 1999 UPA allows the father to be anyone who
intended to be the father.223 Unmarried women who intend to co-
parent with a man must register, but are thus able to establish
legal paternity. 224 Lesbian couples do not have this option.
This failure on the part of NCCUSL creates a host of
consequences. In spite of the recognizable improvements to the
UPA, it has left too many issues untouched. 225 Though the
Prefatory Note claims to avoid issues of custody and visitation, it
necessarily affects these issues in the states where the UPA is
adopted, as many states statutorily grant standing to sue for
custody or visitation to those legally recognized as parents under
the UPA.226
b. To be Truly Remedial, the UPA Must Recognize that Some
Children Have Same-sex Parents.
The changes made to the ART provision of the UPA are
insubstantial in light of the real problems faced by same-sex
parents in all contexts. The effect the revisions will have on
lesbian parents with ART children is questionable. The proposed
revisions to the 1999 UPA still define parentage from an
exclusively biological perspective, ignoring the reality that being a
220. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973); accord
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upal099.htm (Oct. 1999).
221. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 806 (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa/upal099.htm (Oct. 1999).
222. See id. § 802(c).
223. See id.
224. See id. § 301.
225. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-19 (Ct. App. 1991)
(awarding sole legal custody to the biological mother). In Nancy S., the petitioner
was requesting that the court give her status as a parent so she could obtain joint
custody or visitation with her and her former partner's children. See id. at 214.
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parent involves much more than the contribution of genetic
matter.227 The paramount goal of the 1999 UPA in its entirety is
still the determination of a father.228  However, establishing
paternity is not always necessary where a child has two parental
figures that actively participate in its life and provide love,
nurturing, and material comforts. 229 For these fortunate children,
the biological sex of their parents is irrelevant.
230
A review of Article 8, which addresses ART, discloses that
NCCUSL clearly has not embraced the concept of intentional
parenthood by unmarried women. 231 Nor does it allow for the
possibility that a child could have two mothers. Therefore, courts
will continue to search for a second parent of the opposite sex,
even where a same-sex parent is present and pleading for legal
parental status. If the UPA is to follow the principle that it is "in
every child's best interest to have two parents,"
232 it must
recognize two parents whenever possible, even if both parents are
of the same sex. Notwithstanding its recent revisions, the UPA
remains incapable of providing a practical solution for same-sex
parents and adequate protection for their children.
In addition to Article 8, another section of the 1999 LPA may
be of importance to same-sex parents. The 1999 UPA added
Article 7, entitled "Parentage Based on Equitable Estoppel.
233
227. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edulibrary/ulc/upa/upa1099.htm (Oct. 1999).
228. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (Proposed Revisions 1999), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/upa1099.htm (Oct. 1999).
229. See generally David K. Flaks et al., Lesbians Choosing Motherhood: A
Comparative Study of Lesbian and Heterosexual Parents and Their Children, 3 1(1)
DEV. PSYCHOL. 105, 105-14 (1995) (presenting results of comprehensive
comparative analysis of children of lesbian co-parents and heterosexual parents).
The study found that there are no significant differences between the children of
heterosexual parents and the children of lesbian parents born via ART. See id.
The study also found that "lesbian mothers had more parenting awareness skills
than heterosexual parents." Id. at 111.
230. See id.; see also Jerry J. Bigner & R.B. Jacobsen, Adult Responses to Child
Behavior and Attitudes Toward Fathering: Gay and Nongay Fathers, 23(3) J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 99, 99-112 (1992) (finding that parenting styles and attitudes
towards fathering are substantially similar for gay and heterosexual fathers);
Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-parent Households:
Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24(4) J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY
551, 551-72 (1983) (noting no differences in the children of heterosexual and
homosexual mothers in gender identity, sex-role behavior, friendships and peer
relationships; one difference noted by this study is that psychiatric problems were
more common in the children of heterosexual mothers).
231. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
232. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. Cumberland County,
N.J. 1977).




Article 7 functions to deny a determination of paternity by genetic
testing where another man has held the child out as his own for an
unspecified length of time.234 The effect of the provision may be to
deny parental status to a person who actually is biologically
related to the child. Although the UPA discusses such a situation
only in the context of a man and a woman, this provision may be
significant for lesbian parents, as well.
There have been several custody battles between a non-
biological and a biological mother where the non-biological mother
has attempted to establish parental status by estoppel. 235 Though
this claim has never been successful in court for lesbian mothers,
the fact that the Article 7 of the proposed revisions recognizes
claims of parentage by equitable estoppel for heterosexual parents
may have some effect for same-sex parents. If adopted, this
provision would allow courts to acknowledge that the best
interests of the child may be achieved through legal recognition of
her or his perceived parent, as opposed to only a biological parent.
If courts can do so for children of heterosexual parents, they may
be willing to extend application of the estoppel theory to children
of homosexual parents. To make this possibility a reality,
NCCUSL should include a provision in the final draft that
accounts for same-sex couples in the same way that it accounts for
heterosexual couples. Because same-sex couples necessarily rely
on third-party biological donors, they and their children have a
much greater need for the parentage by estoppel theory than
opposite-sex couples do.
E. The UPA Should Adopt an Intent-based Standard to
Determine the Parentage of ART Children.
To remedy and prevent ongoing problems in determining
legal parent-child relationships regarding ART children, the UPA
should adopt an intent-based standard. The parties involved in
234. See id.
235. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-19 (Ct. App. 1991)
(awarding sole legal custody to the biological mother). In Nancy S., the court was
evaluating a non-biological mother's claim to visitation or custody rights to her
children. See id. The petitioner proffered three arguments, one of which was
parentage based on equitable estoppel. See id. at 217. The court denied this claim
on two grounds. See id. at 218. First, it said that parenthood by equitable estoppel
is reserved for paternity suits where a presumed father is attempting to avoid
support payments by denying paternity after he has held the children out as his
own. See id. at 217. The court said that estoppel could not apply to petitioner
because she was not a putative father, but rather merely a "nonparent." See id. at
218; see also Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 27, 29-30 (N.Y. 1991) (stating
that parenthood by estoppel is simply insufficient to overcome the objections of a
biological parent and denying the non-biological mother any rights to the children).
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ART should be able to contract or agree amongst themselves to
determine who will be the legal parent(s) of the child. Because
intent can change over time, contracts should be entered into
around the time of conception. Those involved should not be forced
to draft complex legal documents requiring the assistance of an
attorney, since doing so could potentially violate their need for
privacy. If a contract is not entered into to establish legal
parentage of the child, the court should look at extrinsic evidence
to find out what the intent of the parties was at the time of
conception. Intent should be determinative, unless it is found that
the best interests of the child would be better served by denying
one parent custody or visitation with the child.
Adopting an intent-based standard would resolve the
unfavorable situation which arises when sperm donors intervene
unexpectedly and against the child's and the mothers' wishes. It
would also allow both mothers in a lesbian couple to have legal
recognition as parents. In addition, an intent-based standard for
lesbian mothers would provide a baseline for courts to work from
for other non-traditional families. 236 Allowing the "parents" to
predetermine the role each will (or will not) play in the child's life
at the time of conception would benefit both the child and the
parent(s) by creating legal security to maintain family autonomy
indefinitely. 237
IV. Conclusion
Recent case law regarding ART children demonstrates that
courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to be bound by the UPA
when it so obviously yields unjust results. Courts are regularly
compelled to address legal problems that arise in the modern, non-
236. Modern technology allows a range of situations involving multiple
"parents." Reproductive technology allows a child to be conceived by a sperm donor
and an egg donor, carried to term by a gestational mother, and raised by another
individual or individuals. Therefore, it is possible for five persons to have claims of
parental rights to a single child. See generally Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men
Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive
Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 183-246 (1995) (discussing various
technologies gays and lesbians utilize in creating their families).
237. For lesbian parents in particular, the lack of legal security may result in
unfortunate circumstances for both mother(s) and child. For example, if one
mother were to die unexpectedly, neither the surviving mother nor the child could
necessarily take through intestate succession. If the mothers split up, the child has
no guarantee of continued financial support. See supra notes 30, 211 and
accompanying text. Finally, there is always the risk that the sperm donor could
intervene in the child's life if paternity is established. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text. With the support of law in determining the identity of an ART
child's parents, the child's future will be much more predictable legally, financially
and emotionally.
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traditional family, and thus have begun to realize the need for
legal recognition of same-sex parents. However, in more than one-
third of all states, courts are unable to legally recognize these
relationships since they must enforce the law as it stands.
The UPA must respond to the changes in society and the
American family structure by creating an intent-based standard to
determine the parentage of ART children, thereby allowing true
family autonomy for lesbian mothers and other non-traditional
families. The proposed revisions to the UPA provide the ideal
vehicle for change. It is now up to NCCUSL or state legislatures
to address the issue of same-sex parents and give these parents
legal recognition. By adopting an intent-based standard for
children of same-sex parents conceived through ART, the revised
UPA will equip the courts to settle disputes over custody and
paternity in an equitable manner that is truly in the best interests
of these children.
